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keeping in mind the disadvantages implicit in either result, the Court would
still seem best advised to
refuse to order arbitration of a work assignment [or representa-
tional] dispute whenever only one of the contending unions would
be a party to the arbitration proceeding. Whatever difficulties
recourse to the NLRB may pose, that forum can produce a definite,
peaceful solution at least some of the time. An arbitration pro-
ceeding with one of the vitally interested parties missing holds no
such promise."
If the decision holds little promise of a definitive solution in this type
of situation, it does, at the same time, substantially reinforce the policy
premium presently paid both arbitration and section 301 actions. Since
arbitration will be accommodated even in such an inherently imperfect setting,
it can certainly expect continued broad encouragement. Moreover, if the
instant case does not present a problem of sufficient seriousness to require
application of the preemption rationale, few, if any, other cases will, and the
trend toward court determination of all alleged collective bargaining breaches
is likewise strengthened. Thus, by not engrafting an exception to the Smith
rationales° on these facts, the Court lends further support to the non-exclusive-
ness of section 301 actions, which may well be the primary significance of
the opinion.
THOMAS F. COLLINS
Labor Law—Section 301 of LMRA—Refusal to Remand to State Court
for Injunction for Breach of No-Strike Clause.—H. A. Lott v. Hoisting
el Portable Engineers' Union.'—This is an action in contract brought
in a state court by an employer against a union for damages and injunc-
tive relief for breach of the no-strike clause in their collective bargaining
agreement. The defendants petitioned for removal to the United States
District Court, predicating jurisdiction on Section 301(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act)? Upon removal the plaintiff
moved in the District Court for remand of his petition to the state court
for an injunction inasmuch as Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Acts pre-
cludes the federal court from granting the equitable relief requested. On
this motion to remand the court HELD: Under the removal statute* the
suit for damages could be transferred to the federal court. Therefore, in
the interests of a uniform approach to section 301 cases the court will
85 Sovern, supra note 25, at 576.
86 See quote in text, supra at note 14, Smith v. Evening News, supra note 12, at
197-98.
1 222 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Texas 1963).
2 Labor Management Relations Act § 301(a), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) (1958).
3 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 4, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).




retain jurisdiction over both the removable claim for damages and the non-
removable claim for injunctive relief.
With the growing realization during the 1930's that greater public con-
trol of private economic concerns was a virtual necessity for the main-
tenance of a stable economy, there occurred a substantial increase in the
size and importance of federal public law. The enactment of the National
Labor Relations Act5
 (Wagner Act) was one of the more significant achieve-
ments of this era. The statute was accompanied by an obvious congressional
purpose that this relatively new body of federal labor relations law should
develop free from confusion and diverse interpretation. This would most
certainly occur if state courts were permitted to serve as additional forums
for the adjudication of matters with which this legislation was concerned.
Hence the National Labor Relations Board was given exclusive jurisdiction
to enforce the provisions of the act.
The United States Supreme Court's policy in favor of a uniform body of
federal labor law came glaringly to the forefront when the NLRB began to
systematically exercise certain of its discretionary powers under the Act.
Starting in the 1940's the Board, first by a spotty case by case approach,° and
later through more comprehensive administration pronouncements, 7 began to
restrict its own jurisdiction so as to take action only when the unfair labor
practice had a substantial effect upon interstate commerce. At the same time,
over a period of almost two decades, the state courts had gradually begun to
fill the vacuum left by this withdrawal of jurisdiction by the Board. Then, in
1957, the United States Supreme Court in Cuss v. Utah Labor Relations
Bd.8 held that in view of congressional policy favoring a uniform body
of federal labor law the states had no jurisdiction with respect to the settle-
ment of a labor dispute affecting interstate commerce in an area covered by
the National Labor Relations Act, despite the refusal of the Board to concern
itself with this dispute. Congress, apparently dissatisfied with such a result,
eliminated this no-man's-land effect left by the Cuss case by a provision
of the 1959 Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act° which
specifically provides for state court jurisdiction where the Board has refused
to take action. 1 ° Thus Congress, by amending the NLRA so as to provide
greater jurisdiction for state tribunals in the area of labor relations law,
made more difficult and dubious the Court's adherence to their policy of
rigid uniformity of national labor law.
The Court's continued desire for uniform labor law can also be gleaned
from a series of decisions" beginning in the 1950's in which the Court rather
consistently held that the NLRA has preempted state court jurisdiction
over common law actions and suits in equity involving torts or breaches of
5 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.G. 4 151 (1958).
6 Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison, 309 U.S. 261 (1940).
7 NLRB Press Release, R-342, Oct. 6, 1950. •
8 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
9 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. 	 401 (Supp. IV, 1963).
to 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. 4 164(c) (2) (Supp. IV, 1963).
11 Local 207, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963); San
Diego Bldg. and Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) ; Garner v. Teamsters
Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
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contract where the defendant's conduct arguably constituted an unfair labor
practice. In one of the earlier of these "preemption cases"" the Court con-
cisely set forth its "uniformity position" when it said: "A multiplicity of
tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incom-
patible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantivelaw
	
.ms
This uniform approach seems to be based upon the Court's fear,
as expressed by Justice Frankfurter, that "to allow the States to con-
trol activities that are potentially subject to federal regulation involves too
great a danger of conflict with national labor policy." 14
 The necessity of
such a uniform approach has nonetheless been seriously questioned by
members of the Labor Bar who, speaking directly to Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's rationale, point out that conflict between state court decisions and
NLRB rulings are virtually non-existent." Indeed, the advisability of
uniformity, at least to the extent of vesting such exclusive unfair labor
practice jurisdiction in an administrative agency has of late been under
considerable attack."
The inherent disorder in the philosophy of uniformity came to the
surface in the Court's decision in the 1957 case of Textile Workers Union
of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama." In interpreting Section 301 of
the Taft Hartley Act as it applied to a suit in a federal court to enforce
an arbitration clause equitably, the Court held that Congress intended
that the federal judiciary develop a body of labor law under section 301
based on federal law. Then in a series of decisions dealing with section 301
handed down in 1962, the Court, deviating somewhat from this policy of
uniformity, began to lay the groundwork for the problem faced by the
federal district court in the Lott case.
In Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney" the Court held that a state
court was not preempted by section 301 from entertaining a petition for
damages for breach of a collective bargaining contract and that the long
series of preemption cases including San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon" did not apply. The Court stated that the draftsmen of section
301 did not intend thereby to preempt the field so far as suits for breach
of collective bargaining contracts are concerned. Then, as if to make this
latter ruling consistent with their policy of "uniformity," the Court in
Lucas Flour Co. v. Local 174, Teamsters Union20 extended the doctrine
12 Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra note II.
18 Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra note 11, at 490-91.
14 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, supra note 11, at 246.
15 Sovern, Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 Harv. L.
Rev. 529, 571 (1963).
16 On August 27, 1963, Representative Landrum [co-sponsor of Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act, supra note 81 introduced H.R. 8246, a bill to divest the
National Labor Relations Board of its jurisdiction over unfair labor practice cases,
such jurisdiction to be assumed by the United States district courts. H.R. 8246, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., 109 Cong. Rec. 15196 .(1963).
17 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
18 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
18 Supra note 11.
20 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
828
CASE NOTES
of Lincoln Mills." The Court ruled that state courts, although not pre-
empted by section 301 from entertaining breach of contract suits, must
apply federal labor law. Although effectively eliminating the possibility of
two independent bodies of substantive labor law being applied under section
301, the Court had nonetheless made possible the very evil complained of
in the Garner case—"a multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of proce-
dures [producing] incompatible or conflicting adjudications."22
Another substantial departure from its uniformity approach took
place when the Court held in Smith v. Evening News Ass'n23 that an in-
dividual employee's action to enforce a collective bargaining contract, the
breach of which involved an unfair labor practice, was authorized by sec-
tion 301 and hence was not preempted by the Garman rule Such suits,
previously heard only before the Board, could now be brought to state courts
under Charles Dowd Box.
The most significant of, all these decisions, in terms of the above
dichotomy, had been delivered by the Court just prior to the Smith case.
In Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson24 the Court held that a federal court
was precluded from granting injunctive relief for breach of a no-strike clause
in a section 301 action unless the circumstances of the case permitted such
relief by the terms of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Thus the Court's decision
in the Sinclair case coupled with its other 1962 decisions mentioned above
created the anomalous situation of the state courts, whose equitable powers
remained untouched, becoming the only forum from which the plaintiff
could obtain complete relief and hence the more desirable forum for. section
301-type actions.
Lott appears to be the first case where a federal court, faced with the
Sinclair decision, , has decided to prevent state courts from becoming the
preferred forum for section 301 actions. Rather than taking the position
that Norris-LaGuardia simply precluded federal courts from granting cer-
tain equitable relief, and thereby escaping the problem involved in the re-
mand question, the instant court, citing National Dairy Prods. Corp. v.
Heffernan25 held that Norris-LaGuardia precluded the federal court from
taking cognizance of an action for injunctive relief. The court in the instant
case went on, however, to hold that despite this jurisdictional incapacity
(citing National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Haffernan 2° and Swift & Co. v.
United ,Packinghouse Workers") the federal courts under Rule 12(h) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were able to remove from a state
court that which is normally a non-removable claim when it is joined with a
removable claim. The removable claim in this case was one for damages
for breach of a collective bargaining contract. It is at this point, however,
that the court begins to depart from the position taken in these earlier
federal cases.
21 Supra note 17.
22 Supra note 11, at 490-91,
23 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
24 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
25 195 F. Supp. 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
26 Ibid.
27 177 F. Supp. 511 (I). Colo. 1959).
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In Swift & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers 28 where plaintiff's
suit for damages and injunctive relief was removed to federal court, the
court retained the damage petition, and remanded the petition for an in-
junction, holding that, although the applicable statute 29 gave the court dis-
cretion to remove non-transferrable claims if joined with transferrable
claims "it would be incongruous to hold that the case, insofar as it seeks
injunctive relief, is removable and then shortly thereafter hold that that
part of the complaint is dismissed for lack of jurisdicton under Norris-La-
Guardia."80
In National Dairy Prods. v. Heffernan, 3 ' where a suit for damages
and injunctive relief had been transferred to federal court, the court agreed
with the Swift decision but chose instead to dismiss the equitable claim for
lack of jurisdiction (not upon the merits) rather than use the remand de-
vice, and in doing so stated that after refusal to remand such a dismissal
must be issued. Thus the court in Lott has refused to follow the holding in
Swift, to wit, despite any discretion which concededly is present, the court
as a matter of propriety should remand back to the state court any case
a part of which has doubtful jurisdiction. Nor did the court follow the de-
cision in Heffernan, which case would seem even more difficult for the Lott
court to ignore, in view of the former court's mandatory language with respect
to the pertinent rule of civil procedure. On the contrary, rejecting the holdings
in these cases the court in the principal case used its procedural powers to pre-
vent the state courts from granting or even hearing the petitioner's claim for
injunctive relief. The court here bases such exercise of its procedural powers
on the belief that when the Lincoln Mills "uniformity of federal labor law"
approach is read in conjunction with the Court's position against exempting
section 301 actions in federal court from the provisions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, the employer should not be allowed to seek an injunctive
remedy in state court once the federal court has jurisdiction over the suit.
Obviously the court is not holding that the Sinclair ruling extends to state
court injunctive proceedings. This issue has not yet been decided. Indeed,
Justice Stewart speaking for the majority in the Dowd case alluded to the
. case of McCarrot v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters" in
which injunctive relief against a strike in violation of a no-strike clause was
granted by a California court. Justice Stewart stated that to argue:
that section 301(a) operates to deprive state courts of a sub-
stantial segment of their established jurisdiction over contract
actions would . . . disregard the particularized history behind
the enactment of that provision of the federal labor law. The
legislative history makes clear that the basic purpose of sec-
tion 301(a) was not to limit, but to expand, the availability of
forums for the enforcement of contracts made by labor organiza-
tions.33
28 Ibid.
28 Supra note 4.
30 Supra note 27, at 515.
81 Supra note 25.
82 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957).
88 Supra note 18, at 508-09.
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Nonetheless this limitation on availability of forums is exactly the
effect of the decision in the Lott case. The Texas federal court, adhering
to the Supreme Court's traditional uniformity obsession in an area where
it has been largely discarded (albeit begrudgingly) by the Court itself,
ignores what was virtually a congressional mandate and has worked a
considerable hardship on the injured employer. The court in the interests of
this questionable federal judicial policy has precluded the plaintiff from
obtaining the most essential part of his petition—injunctive relief against
further breathes of the no-strike clause by the defendant-union.
The United States Supreme Court's specific remark as to the absence
of any ruling on their part with respect to the applicability of Norris-La-
Guardia to state court injunction proceedings, coupled with the implications
which obtain from the Court's statement as to the non-preemptive nature
of section 301, would seem to have foreclosed any attempt by the district
court to extend the Sinclair ruling to state court proceedings. It would thus
appear that the district court's ruling in the Lott case was based on the more
narrow ground that because the plaintiff's injunctive claim was brought
in a state court simultaneously with his petition for damages, the dis-
cretionary remand procedure under Rule I2(h) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure will be used to prevent the state courts from granting such
injunctive relief—injunctive relief which they could unquestionably have
granted had plaintiff brought his injunction petition independently, post-
poning until a later date his petition for damages. Thus this court—in an
effort to eliminate the threat posed by the Dowd, Lucas, Sinclair, and Smith
cases to the doctrine of uniformity of law and uniformity of tribunals for the
regulation of interstate commerce labor disputes—has resorted to the very
procedural niceties, the absence of which had for so long been the hall-
mark of the federal judiciary.
THOMAS P. KENNEDY
Secured Transactions—Tortious Repossession of Inventory—Right of
Debtor to Receive Notice of Disposition of Repossessed Collateral under
Uniform Commercial Code.—Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp).—
In the spring of 1959, the plaintiff, a franchised Chrysler automobile dealer,
agreed to let the defendant credit company finance the purchase of his auto-
mobiles. The defendant was to pay Chrysler Corporation for the cars, the
cars were to be delivered to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was to repay the
defendant immediately upon selling the cars. At the time of contracting, or
shortly thereafter, the defendant made a capital loan of $25,000 to the plain-
tiff, who, in the months that followed, was never in default on this loan but
was often in default on the cars he sold. The defendant, however, disregarded
these defaults, choosing not to enforce its rights under their security arrange-
ment. By the fall of 1960, the plaintiff had fallen in arrears for the price of
several cars. He thereupon applied for a second loan of $25,000, which request
was forwarded through channels to the defendant's New York office where it
1 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
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